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M A R K P I T T AWAY
Abstract
This article examines the process of state reconstruction in Austria and Hungary’s borderlands
that followed the Second World War. This process of state reconstruction was also a process of
pacification, as it represented an attempt to (re)build states on the foundations of the military
settlement of the war. The construction of legitimate state authority was at its most successful
on the Austrian side of the border, where political actors were able to gain legitimacy by creating
a state that acted as an effective protector of the immediate demands of the local community for
security from a variety of threats. On the Hungarian side of the border the state was implicated
with some of the actors who were seen as threatening local communities, something that produced
political polarisation. These differences set the stage for the transition from war to cold war in
the borderlands.
Introduction
During spring 1946, Hungary’s popular front regime, created as a consequence
of the Red Army’s occupation of the country that had ended the Second World
War, proceeded with the deportation of an ethnic German minority that it held
partly responsible for the country’s tragic entanglement in that conflict. In the far
north-west of the country, the deportation, and the broader process of expulsion of
substantial numbers of Germans and their replacement with agrarian settlers from
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Hungary’s interior, was motivated by a desire both to secure the country’s border with
Austria and to build a reliable social basis for left-wing parties within the anti-fascist
ruling coalition – especially the Hungarian Communist Party (Magyar Kommunista
Pa´rt, MKP) – in a region politically hostile to the left.1 The selective nature of
the 1946 deportation and settlement programme shattered village communities. In
Sopronba´nfalva, on the fringes of the city of Sopron, approximately 700 of the 3,304
pre-1945 residents had been allowed to remain.2 They were mostly ethnic German
miners who worked in the nearby pit at Brennbergba´nya, who escaped deportation
because of the dire shortages of skilled labour available for mining, and the importance
of scarce coal to post-war reconstruction. Over the course of 1946 village society
became polarised between the ‘old’ residents and almost three hundred new settlers,
who arrived with the support of the authorities to occupy the houses and property of
the deportees. Tensions came to a head in February 1947, when the local authorities
confiscated all the property of eighty-nine ‘old’ Sopronba´nfalva residents, whom they
accused of membership of the Volksbund, the pre-1945, pro-Berlin association of the
German minority. ‘Old’ residents mobilised against the state by attacking it at its
weakest point. Left-wing parties were the most enthusiastic advocates of deportation,
but they also claimed to rule in the interests of the working class. As many ethnic
Germans worked at the Brennbergba´nya mine, they forced the local trade union
to threaten a solidarity strike with the eighty-nine Sopronba´nfalva residents, forcing
local left-wing parties to demand successfully that confiscated property be returned.3
While acts of state despotism in polarised local communities weakened the
authority of the state on the Hungarian side of the border, 8 km from Sopronba´nfalva
in Austria the local state acted to protect an established local community from the
consequences of upheaval brought about by deportation and the broader process
of expulsion from Hungary. The village of Baumgarten lay only a few hundred
metres from the Hungarian border, and had a population of predominantly Croatian
ethnicity, who worked as agricultural labourers on a large local farm. In 1946 it
employed as the farm manager A.S., an ethnic German refugee from Hungary who
had fled to Austria to avoid deportation. His relations with the workforce were poor
almost from the beginning,4 but they worsened dramatically when he began sacking
Croatian workers and evicting them from tied cottages, in order to replace them with
ethnic German refugees like himself, who had fled to Austria to avoid deportation
1 A´gnes To´th, Migrationen in Ungarn, 1945–1948. Vertreibung der Ungarndeutschen, Binnenwanderungen und
Slowakisch-Ungarischer Bevo¨lkerungsaustausch, trans. Rita Feje´r (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2001);
Andra´s Kirsch, A Soproni ne´metek kitelepı´te´se 1946 (Sopron: Escort Kiado´, 2006).
2 Gy´´or-Moson-Sopron Megye Soproni Leve´lta´ra (Sopron Archives of Gy´´or-Moson-Sopron county,
hereafter GyMSM.SL.), Soproni ja´ra´s f´´ojegyz´´oje´nek iratai, 1945–1950 (Papers of the Chief Notary
of Sopron District, 1945–1950, hereafter XXI/21)/b, 1d., Kimutata´s a soproni ja´ra´s ko¨zse´geinek
lako´ssa´ga´ro´l az 1941.I.31-i ne´psza´mla´la´s adatai, tova´bba az 1945.I./1-i a´llapot szerint.
3 GyMSM.SL., XXI/21/b,14d., Sopronba´nfalva ko¨zse´g Nemzeti Bizottsa´ga. Emle´kirat!, 1947 februa´r
26.
4 Burgenla¨ndisches Landesarchiv (Burgenland Provincial Archive, hereafter BgLA), Bezirkshaupt-
mannschaft Mattersburg (Office of the Mattersburg District Governor, hereafter BH Mattersburg),
XI-Polizei, Abschrift, Draßburg, am 15. Ja¨nner 1949, 1–2.
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to Germany.5 This generated ethnic tensions in the village that grew during the late
1940s and culminated in protest by Baumgarten residents in 1949. A.S. dismissed the
protestors by referring to their ethnicity: ‘You are no Austrians, you are Croatians; we
[ethnic Germans] are better and truer Austrians than you.’6 This statement provoked
a spectacular retaliation from the local Austrian Socialist Party (Sozialistische Partei
O¨sterreichs, SPO¨), the dominant party in Baumgarten. Arguing that A.S. was unable
to prove his status as an Austrian citizen, and was a threat to the local community,
it interceded, using its influence over security issues in the provincial government
to ban him permanently from residence in Burgenland, the easternmost Austrian
province which lay along the international border with Hungary, using a law passed
by the Nazis in August 1938 to remove ‘undesirables’.7
These two incidents reveal the different ways in which the Austrian and Hungarian
states approached the creation of the post-war peace, and the process of state
(re)construction on which it rested. The experience of the war and its end in
the Austrian–Hungarian borderland focused residents on the immediate needs of
their local communities, especially for material security. This focusing of political
aspiration on the local generated demands for a politics that concentrated less on
national, or ideological, mobilisation than had been the case in the pre-war years.
Residents demanded that would-be state builders combat the insecurity generated
by the military and economic impact of war by shaping protective institutions and
practices that focused on these local community needs. The post-war Austrian and
Hungarian state-building projects differed profoundly in the way in which they
confronted this political environment. The emergent Hungarian state utterly failed
to address popular aspirations adequately, and thus proved unable to build for itself
legitimate state authority that would have enabled it to overcome generalised political
polarisation, which its practices instead exacerbated. Furthermore, its despotism
generated real fear outside its borders, which further increased demands for protection
in those Austrian communities that were Hungary’s most immediate neighbours.
Austrian state builders, on the other hand, proved relatively successful in constructing
legitimate state authority in the post-war climate, because they built institutions and
practices that served to protect local communities in the borderland from a variety
of external threats, both real and imagined.
A focus on processes of pacification and state (re)construction in the Austrian–
Hungarian borderland sheds light on the social history of the early cold war and
trajectories of post-war state formation more generally. This is not to deny the
importance of international and high politics in determining eventual political
outcomes. The Moscow Declaration in 1943, the existence of a unified Austrian
government from 1945 and four-power, rather than simply Soviet, occupation played
a decisive role in Austria’s integration into Western economic and political structures,
5 BgLA, BH-Mattersburg, XI-Polizei, Draßburg, am 12. Ja¨nner 1949, Niederschrift, 1.
6 BgLA, BH Mattersburg, XI-Polizei, Gendarmeriepostenkommando Drassburg, am 31.1.1949.
Niederschrift, 1.
7 BgLA, BH Mattersburg, XI-Polizei, Bezirkshauptmannschaft Mattersburg. Zahl: XI-57/3-1949.
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while Hungary found itself part of the Soviet bloc. In Austria the unity between the
dominant political traditions – political Catholicism represented by the Austrian
People’s Party (O¨sterreichische Volkspartei, O¨VP), and social democracy represented
by the SPO¨ – against the tiny Austrian Communist Party (Kommunistische Partei
O¨sterreichs, KPO¨) contrasted with the bitter polarisation across the border in
Hungary between a left led by the MKP, supported by the Soviet occupation forces,
and the centre-right majority.8 An exclusive focus on high, and international politics,
suggests that local communities and their residents played a role that was essentially
passive in the shaping of the post-war peace. This article, by contrast, seeks to show
that the reception of the projects of national and international actors at local level
played a central role in their success or failure in constructing legitimate state authority.
The post-war Hungarian state’s failure to do so helped to determine the local
dynamics of the country’s slide into dictatorship and the consequent intensification
of despotism in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The Austrian state’s relative success
aided its consolidation and the population’s pacification. They also textured the local
experience of the early cold war in the borderland.
The politics of protection
At the turn of 1945, despite the considerable violence perpetrated by both the
German and Hungarian states against tens of thousands of Jewish forced labourers
building border defences for Germany, and the penury brought about by the end
of the conflict, populations on both sides of border were deeply fearful of what
the end of the war might bring. In north-western Hungary this fear provoked the
flight of much of the local population – especially in those villages with substantial
ethnic German populations – in the face of the advance of the Red Army. In the
Mosonmagyaro´va´r district – next to the border with the collapsing German Reich –
around 40 per cent of the population had gone before the new occupiers arrived.9
Across the border the pattern of flight was similar. In Nickelsdorf, 70 per cent of the
total population left.10 Just as in Hungary, the regime demanded that the population
flee with them. In Gols, Nazi officials threatened to shoot those who insisted on
staying, asking them ‘if they wished to be communists’. The village’s party leadership
attempted to remove most of the cattle, taking them from their owners and letting
8 For Austria see Oliver Rathkolb, Die paradoxe Republik. O¨sterreich 1945 bis 2005 (Vienna: Zsolnay,
2005); Peter Berger, Kurze Geschichte O¨sterreichs im 20. Jahrhundert (Vienna: WUV, 2007), 232–70. For
Hungary, see La´szlo´ Borhi, Hungary in the Cold War 1945–1956: Between the United States and the Soviet
Union (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2004); Peter Kenez, Hungary from
the Nazis to the Soviets: the Establishment of the Communist Regime in Hungary, 1944–1948 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2006); Mark Pittaway, ‘The Politics of Legitimacy and Hungary’s Postwar
Transition’, Contemporary European History, 13, 4 (2004), 453–75.
9 Gy´´or-Moson-Sopron Megye Gy´´ori Leve´lta´ra (Gy´´or Archives of Gy´´or-Moson-Sopron county,
hereafter GyMSM.Gy.L.), Gy´´or-Moson megye e´s Gy´´or thj. va´ros f´´oispa´nja (The Prefect of Gy´´or-
Moson County and the City of Gy´´or, hereafter XXIf.1)a.1d., Jelente´s Gy´´or, Moson e´s Pozsony k.e.e.
va´rmegye´k alispa´nja´to´l
10 BgLA, Landeshauptmannschaft Burgenland (Burgenland Governor’s Office, hereafter A/VIII-11)/V,
Nickelsdorf. Berichte der Gemeinden u¨ber die Ereignisse 1945–1956.
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them free. The behaviour of Nazi activists – who had internalised their leaders’
demands that they ‘fight until the end’ – generated considerable fear.11
Those who remained faced the Red Army. In western Hungary attitudes to the
Soviet troops were defined by the wave of lawlessness that accompanied their arrival.
In April 1945, in the Mosonmagyaro´va´r district,
[O]ccupying forces . . . during their searches for enemy soldiers became interested in wine, and
spirits, as well as pocket, and wrist watches. In those villages where they got hold of drink, they
did not refrain from raping the women either. In the places where they rested, or where they were
stationed they took food and clothing from the population.12
In Csorna, Red Army troops stationed in the small town stripped the population of
its property: ‘in general they took clothes and food, in many houses they removed
the furniture and in others emptied the yards. A few days after the occupation they
began to search for the warehouses, and from those they took all the corn and food
stored.’13 The extent of rape in the city of Sopron provoked panic among midwives
and doctors, who at the end of April 1945 petitioned the county authorities to relax
restrictions immediately on the performance of abortions.14
The actions of Soviet troops produced widespread fear. When local schools
reopened in Gy´´or in May 1945, inaccurate rumours spread that the local Soviet
command had sent ‘two trucks’ to a local school in order ‘to take away the pupils’.
Within a short space of time, ‘the greater mass of pupils and parents shouted out
that others “should flee to their homes, because the Russians are taking away the
children”’, a situation that resulted in panic.15 The behaviour of Soviet troops created
serious problems for Hungary’s new civil authorities who represented the provisional
government, a popular front coalition that had been constituted under Soviet auspices,
in which the MKP was the first among equals. Many in conservative regions, such
as the counties of Gy´´or-Moson and Sopron that were adjacent to the border of
the newly restored Austria, expected the new authorities to intercede to protect
their communities from the occupying forces, and believed, because of their political
stance, that they were able to do so effectively. In late April a lorry carrying an armed
Soviet officer and eight soldiers turned up in the village of Me´nf´´ocsanak. After
searching the village they rounded up eleven pigs from the residents at gunpoint,
driving off with them and refusing to pay the owners. The irregular village police
force, which was unarmed, was powerless to defend the villagers, leaving village
authorities to demand that the county government intervene to secure the return
11 BgLA, Bezirkshauptmannschaft Neusiedl am See (Office of the Neusiedl am See District Governor,
hereafter BH Neusiedl), Verschiedenes-XI-1945, Abschrift: Gendarmerieposten Gols, Gols, am. 11
Okt. 1945.
12 GyMSM.Gy.L., XXIf.1b.1d., A magyaro´va´ri ja´ra´s f´´oszolgabira´ja´to´l. ad 1132/1943.sz. Ta´rgy: 1945. e´vi
a´prilis helyzetjelente´s, 1.
13 GyMSM.SL., Sopron Megye e´s Sopron Va´ros F´´oispa´nja´nak iratai (Papers of the Lord-Lieutenant of
the County and City of Sopron, hereafter XXI/11f.), 2d., Csorna ko¨zse´g jegyz´´ose´gt´´ol. 1485/1945.
sza´m. Ta´rgy: Jelente´ste´tel Csorna ko¨zse´g a´ltala´nos helyzete´r´´ol, 1.
14 GyMSM.SL., XXI/11f.,2d., Leve´l dr. Ha´m Tibor urnak, Sopron, 1945 a´prilis 30.
15 GyMSM.Gy.L., XXIf.1a.,1d., Jegyz´´oko¨nyv ke´szu¨lt 1945.ma´jus 17-e´n, 1
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of the ‘stolen’ pigs.16 In Hegyeshalom, when Soviet troops confiscated the only cow
owned by one agricultural labourer, village authorities demanded that the county
authorities intercede to secure the return of all locally owned cattle, given that many
of their owners had ‘large families and young children to feed’.17 This perception
was encouraged by the pro-Soviet rhetoric of communist leaders, for they argued
that they represented a promise of ‘liberation’ from ‘from the German/Arrow Cross18
fascists’ that had been brought by the Red Army.19 Consequently, the experience of
Soviet occupation undermined support seriously for the post-war state in western
Hungary.
On the other side of the border, the population did not perceive the
emergent Austrian state in the Soviet zone of occupation to have any privileged
relationship with the Red Army. The wave of widespread violence, theft, rape and
murder committed by Soviet troops endured by western Hungarian communities
was repeated across Burgenland. It did not, however, have the same political
consequences.20 The trauma of rape played a fundamental role in generating fear
and insecurity.21 Soviet troops were not the only ‘outsiders’ who fuelled the disorder
during spring and summer 1945. The arrival of the Red Army led to the freeing
of substantial numbers of prisoners of war, who worked as forced labourers on the
land during the war years.22 When freed they joined the wave of terror against the
local population – in one incident in July 1945, 4,000 Greek former prisoners of
war, who had been freed from a camp in Wiener Neustadt, descended on the village
of Po¨ttsching and forced their way into the homes and gardens of the population,
stealing what they could. When local police irregulars intervened, a hail of stones
confronted them, and they beat a hasty retreat.23 Around the town of Mattersburg,
local authorities believed that Soviet troops and bands of freed Ukrainian prisoners
16 GyMSM.Gy.L., XXIf.1b.1d., Me´nf´´ocsanak jegyz´´ose´gt´´ol. Ta´rgy: Se´rtesige´nybeve´tel, Me´nf´´ocsanak,
1945. a´prilis 25.
17 GyMSM.Gy.L., XXIf.1b.1d., Hegyeshalom ko¨zse´g elo¨lja´ro´sa´gto´l. Jegyz´´oko¨nyv ke´szu¨lt Hegyeshalom
ko¨zse´gben 1945 a´prilis 26-a´n.
18 Hungary’s National Socialist Party, brought to power by a German-backed coup d’e´tat in October
1944.
19 Koma´rom-Esztergom Megyei O¨nkorma´nyzat Leve´lta´ra (Local Government Archive of Koma´rom-
Esztergom County, hereafter KEMO¨L), Az MKP Tata Ja´ra´si Bizottsa´ga´nak iratai (Papers of the Tata
District Committee of the MKP, hereafter XXXV.24f.)1 ´´o.e., 2.
20 Sonja Wagner, ‘“Der Sowjetstern auf dem Schlossberg”. Besatzungserfahrungen im Burgenland’, in
Stefan Karner and Barbara Stelzl-Marx, eds., Die Rote Armee in O¨sterreich. Beitra¨ge. Sowjetische Besatzung
1945–1955 (Munich: R.Oldenbourg Verlag, 2005), 497.
21 Pia Bayer, ‘Die Rolle der Frau in der burgenla¨ndischen Besatzungszeit, 1945–1955’, in Felix Tobler,
ed., Befreien – Besetzen – Bestehen: Das Burgenland von 1945–1955. Tagungsband des Symposions des
Burgenla¨ndischen Landesarchivs vom 7. – 8. April 2005 (Eisenstadt: Amt d. Burgenla¨nd. Landesregierung,
Abt. 7, 2005), 139–50.
22 Ela Hornung, Ernst Langthaler and Sabine Schweitzer, Zwangsarbeit in der Landwirtschaft in
Niedero¨sterreich und dem no¨rdlichen Burgenland (Vienna and Munich: R.Oldenbourg Verlag, 2004).
23 BgLA, BH Mattersburg, XI-Polizei-Besondere Vorfa¨lle, Gendarmerieposten Po¨ttsching. E.Nro.18.
Vorkomisse in Po¨ttsching durch Ausla¨nder.
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of war worked in concert to pillage the area’s vineyards.24 The crime wave and
food shortages, focused local residents on the needs of local communities. Residents
in Drassburg demanded greater protection against ‘outsiders’ and ‘foreigners’, who
threatened ‘the property and security of residents’ in August 1945.25
The perception of the state as a credible protector of the security of local
communities was shaped not only by their perceived relationship with the Red
Army, but by their concrete policies towards policing and crime. As in Hungary,
the authorities at both provincial and federal level in Austria asked villages to
organise their own, unarmed, irregular, volunteer police forces to keep the peace.26
In Hungary the popular front government, suspicious of an organisation that had
enthusiastically supported the wartime and then the Arrow Cross regimes, and
had played a central role in the organisation of the deportation of Jews in 1944,
disbanded the gendarmerie outright.27 In Austria, while the KPO¨ was suspicious
of the gendarmerie, it was marginalised within the federal government in Vienna,
dominated by the O¨VP and SPO¨, which strongly supported the institution.28 While
the gendarmerie survived, communist suspicion of it meant that in the Soviet zone
its powers and its right to carry arms were curbed severely by the occupation
authorities.29 Tension between local gendarmerie commanders and communists could
explode into protest, especially in the small number of communities where the KPO¨
enjoyed significant support.30 Given the demands of communities for protection in
the climate of crime and insecurity, majorities supported strengthening the police and
the routine arming of gendarmes as part of a drive to bolster institutions capable of
protecting local communities. This was especially the case since police irregulars often
had few means, and little power, to protect the population.31 This popular pressure
was in turn used by provincial and federal authorities to secure Soviet consent for the
routine arming of the gendarmerie.32
If the politics of law and order in eastern Austria demonstrated the ways in which
legitimate state authority was reconstructed around a desire for the protection of local
24 BgLA, BH Mattersburg, XI-Situationsberichte, Gendarmeriepostenkommando Mattersburg.
E.Nr.183. Situationsbericht vom 15. bis 31. August, 1945, 1.
25 BgLA, BH Mattersburg, XI-Situationsberichte, Gendarmeriepostenkommando Drassburg. Er.Nr.34.
Situationsbericht vom 4.8. bis 8.8.1945.
26 BgLA A/VIII-11/VI, Gemeindeamt Deutsch-Jahrndorf. 12. Juli 1960. Zl:207/1960. Betr.: Ereignisse
1945–1956.
27 Andra´s Zolta´n Kova´cs, ‘Csend´´orsors Magyarorsza´gon 1945-uta´n’, in Imre Okva´th, ed., Katonai perek
a kommunista diktatu´ra id´´oszaka´ban 1945–1958 (Budapest: To¨rte´neti Hivatal, 2001), 103–40.
28 Manfred Mugrauer, Die Politik der KPO¨ in der Provisorischen Regierung Renner (Innsbruck: Studien
Verlag, 2006).
29 BgLA, BH Mattersburg, XI-Situationsberichte, Gendarmeriepostenkommando Wiesen. Er.Nr.251.
Situationsbericht fu¨r die Zeit vom 14. bis 21. Ja¨nner, 1946, 3.
30 BgLA, BH Neusiedl, Verschiedenes-XI-1945, Landesgendarmeriekommando f.d. Burgenland.
Nr.160. Frauenkirchen, am 20. Oktober 1945.
31 BgLA, BH Mattersburg, XI-Situationsberichte, Gendarmeriepostenkommando Drassburg. Er.Nr.34.
Situationsbericht vom 4.8. bis 8.8.1945.
32 BgLA, Sicherheitsdirektion fu¨r das Burgenland (Burgenland Security Directorate, hereafter A/VIII-
14)/V-1, Zahl: SD891/46. Eisenstadt, 13 June 1946: ‘Betrifft: Waffengebrauchsrecht fu¨r die
Sicherheitsorgane erbeten’.
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communities, then in western Hungary they worked in an entirely different direction.
While Hungary’s population demanded the protection of their communities from
crime, black-marketeering and the occupation authorities, civil government proved
unable to offer this to them. The ‘new’ police force established in spring 1945 barely
existed outside the towns for most of the year. Furthermore, the Mosonmagyaro´va´r
police admitted that they were unable to stem the tide of theft, rape and cross-border
smuggling, given gross understaffing and a dire material situation in which the police
had to work without food or pay.33 Furthermore, they were seen as a party police
force, in the hands of the occupying authorities and the MKP. This was illustrated
dramatically by an incident in the village of Alszopor. On the afternoon of 24 June
1945, a group of Red Army troops arrived in the village, stealing a horse from one
resident. The villagers resolved to take the stolen horse back by force, and in the
melee that ensued one of the troops was killed. The same evening the Red Army
returned, backed by the Sopron police, who arrested twelve locals, including the
village judge. While the police took away those arrested, the Soviet troops raided
houses in search of weapons and stole a number of ‘valuable items’. Incidents like
this confirmed for many that the ‘new’ police, rather than offering them protection,
were instead interested in defending only those who threatened them.34
These incidents were symptomatic of the fact that the Hungarian state and the
left-wing parties that played a central role in state-building during 1945 conceived
the purpose of the police and other security agencies as being primarily to defend
the state-building process against sections of society they believed opposed it. Their
priority was not to protect local communities from either the occupying forces or the
post-war crime wave fed by hyperinflation and generalised penury. In September 1945
a border police station was established at Hegyeshalom as large numbers of refugees
from Germany returned home, for the state realised that among them there could
be ‘a large number of leading fascists, who are attempting to return to Hungary
in secret’.35 Rather than focus on smuggling and organised violent crime, which
generated real misery in borderland communities, the border police concentrated
on screening those returnees they suspected of ‘political unreliability’, who were
sent to a camp where their cases were investigated.36 Furthermore, the police and
their political commanders were most interested in the implementation of anti-fascist
retributive legislation,37 which served to strengthen the impression of many that they
33 GyMSM.GyL., Gy´´or-Moson Megyei Rend´´orkapita´nysa´g (Gy´´or-Moson County Police Captaincy,
hereafter XXIVf.3)/1d., Magyar A´llamrend´´orse´g Mosonmagyaro´va´ri Ja´ra´si Kapita´nysa´ga. Sza´m:
1014/1945. Ta´rgy: A rend´´orse´g mu¨ko¨de´se´r´´ol ke´szitend´´o jelente´s, 1.
34 GyMSM.SL., Csepregi ja´ra´s f´´ojegyz´´oje´nek iratai (Papers of the Chief Notary of Csepreg
District, hereafter XX1/12a), 5d., U´jke´ri ko¨rjegyz´´ose´g. 234/1945. Jelente´s az Alszoporon to¨rte´nt
´´orizetbeve´telekr´´ol.
35 ‘U´j hata´rrende´szeti csoportot a´llitottak fel a Nyugatro´l hazate´r´´ok ellen´´orze´se´re’, Duna´ntu´li Szabad Ne´p,
8 Sept. 1945, 3.
36 Magyar Orsza´gos Leve´lta´r (Hungarian National Archive, hereafter MOL), Belu¨gyminiszte´rium iratai
(Papers of the Ministry of the Interior, hereafter XIX-B-1)-v/4d., Hazahozatali Korma´nybizottsa´g.
690/1945.V.F.P. Kh., Budapest, 1945. okto´ber 8.
37 ‘Ke´tszerese´re emelik a gy´´ormegyei rend´´orse´g le´tsza´ma´t’, Duna´ntu´li Szabad Ne´p, 12 Sept. 1945, 1.
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were more interested in protecting the regime in Budapest than in safeguarding the
security of the population. The police in Mosonmagyaro´va´r were prepared to write
off as ‘hopeless’ fighting crime committed by Soviet troops or organised criminal
gangs, while it measured its ‘success’ by the number of ‘fascists’ it interned – among
whose number it included not merely members of the Arrow Cross, nor those who
had collaborated with the German occupiers after March 1944, but many who had
served the neo-conservative inter-war and wartime regime prior to that date.38
This happened against a backdrop of deep-seated political antagonism between the
state and the population. Gy´´or-Moson and Sopron counties were characterised by a
hegemonic Catholic and conservative political culture that had allowed the dominant
political actors of the conservative, inter-war regime to win considerable support.
Prior to the outbreak of war, anti-communism provided an especially potent part
of the construction of the regime’s local appeal, given the memory of the Soviet
Republic in 1919, and the way in which it was successfully blamed for Hungary’s
territorial losses after the First World War. Even during the 1930s this had turned to
anti-Soviet sentiment; the local pro-government press in Sopron, for example, had
argued that the state that had arisen in Russia after the Revolution of 1917 was a
‘regime of command that had created a new form of capitalism – state capitalism –
in which all the country’s energy was drained into maintaining its rule’, and which
was marked by ‘the most terrible oppression and misery of the Russian people’.39 Its
railing against communism in Hungary, especially against the tyranny of the ‘kolhoz’
over the peasantry, and the immorality of godless communism, however, did not
have merely an abstract meaning for many, given the region’s experience of the
Soviet Republic and the subsequent trauma of border disputes with Austria in the
Sopron region. Throughout the 1930s local elites linked anti-communist propaganda
to local memories of 1919.40
Anti-communism had been a potent theme of wartime propaganda41 and shaped
attitudes that were reinforced by the behaviour of the Red Army and the ‘new’
Hungarian state in local communities. While the outcome of the war discredited
the authoritarian conservatism of the inter-war years, many of the cultural values it
rested on allowed a democratic conservatism – represented largely by the Independent
Smallholders’ Party (Fu¨ggetlen Kisgazdapa´rt, FKgP) – to become dominant in
western border regions. This was despite the fact that while opposing the left and
the MKP’s vision of a socially radical post-war state, it was simultaneously resolutely
anti-fascist and a partner in the popular front coalition government in Budapest.42 In
Csorna, the party’s activists proclaimed their goal as creating an ‘independent country,
38 GyMSM.GyL., XXIVf.3/1d., Magyar A´llamrend´´orse´g Mosonmagyaro´va´ri Ja´ra´si Kapita´nysa´ga. Sza´m:
1014/1945. Ta´rgy: A rend´´orse´g mu¨ko¨de´se´r´´ol ke´szitend´´o jelente´s
39 ‘Felel´´osse´ggel biro magyar ember nem ta´mogahatja a demago´g jelszavakkal doba´lo´zodo´ sze´ls´´ose´geket’,
Soproni Hı´rlap, 10 May 1938, 1.
40 ‘Moszkva´ban agyonl´´otte´k az egykori soproni kommunista va´rosparancsnok huga´t’, Soproni Hı´rlap, 8
Jan. 1938, 1.
41 ‘Komoly id´´ok intelmei’, Mosonva´rmegye Magyaro´va´ri Hı´rlap, 27 Jan. 1944, 1.
42 Pittaway, ‘Politics of Legitimacy’, 466–68.
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a clean, Christian democracy’.43 Such rhetoric allowed them to claim support as
the party that could oppose the Soviet occupation successfully. In Gy´´or-Moson,
in advance of the 1945 elections, many believed that if the country ‘votes for the
Smallholders’ Party then the Soviets will be forced to leave the country, if they vote for
the communists, they’ll stay forever’.44 As elections approached, the FKgP, backed by
public opinion in the borderland, attacked the police focus on anti-fascist retribution.
They concentrated their fire on the Sopron internment camp, where many former
gendarmes, because of their role in the deportations of local Jews in 1944, and other
supporters of the inter-war regime locally, for reasons that were less clear, had been
interned as ‘fascists’. Sopron residents did not believe that the detention of many of
the camps’ inmates was legitimate. The local police were compared both to officials
of the 1919 Soviet Republic and the Gestapo. While persistent antisemitism fed these
protests, so too did a sense that the police stood against the majority of the people
and spent too much time interfering in politics and little on fighting crime.45
In November 1945 the FKgP won a landslide victory over the MKP and its
allies.46 Although the occupying authorities demanded that a popular front coalition
of all anti-fascist parties continue, the elections intensified political polarisation, as
many working-class voters demanded greater assertiveness from the left. The MKP
leadership responded, attacking the FKgP as enemies of democracy. Within days
of the election the MKP warned that ‘it seems that the reaction has drawn the
conclusion from the election results that the coming months will see the elimination
of democracy’. It accused the FKgP of protecting ‘provocateurs’ who ‘victimised’
communists.47 While the MKP and the police it controlled enforced a tough line
against those Smallholders it accused of supporting ‘reaction’, it intensified class-
based rhetoric to mobilise industrial workers, and other supportive groups, who had
become disillusioned as a consequence of the hyper-inflation that had gripped the
country since summer 1945. At Brennbergba´nya it accused the mine management
of using transportation to fetch for themselves ‘fatted geese and ducks’, but not to
bring ‘oil and margarine’ for miners.48 The focus of the MKP’s anti-fascism had
shifted – as internment camps were run down the MKP welcomed working-class
former members of the Arrow Cross, who had held no leadership roles into its ranks,
for they were ‘workers’ who had been ‘cheated into joining fascist organisations’.49
This represented no let-up in retribution, however, against those who had served
43 ‘Ujjongo´ lelkesede´ssel fogadta´k szo´nokainkat a csornai ja´ra´sban’, Soproni U´jsa´g, 18 Oct. 1945, 3.
44 GyMSM.Gy.L., XXIf.1b., 1d., Gy´´or-Moson megye e´s Gy´´or thj. Va´ros. f´´oispa´nja´to´l. 75/5.f´´oisp.
1945.sz. Ta´rgy: Szeptember havi ta´je´koztato´ jelente´s, 1.
45 ‘Komoly munka folyik a va´rosha´za´n’, Soproni U´jsa´g, 14 Oct. 1945, 4.
46 The FKgP won 57.03 per cent of the national vote, the Social Democratic Party 17.41 per cent, the
MKP 16.95 per cent, and the National Peasants’ Party 6.87 per cent; no other party won more than 2
per cent of the votes cast. Information adapted from Sa´ndor Balogh, Va´laszta´sok Magyarorsza´gon 1945.
A f´´ova´rosi to¨rve´nyhato´sa´gi e´s nemzetgy´´ule´si Va´laszta´sok (Budapest: Kossuth Ko¨nyvkiado´, 1984), 147, 161.
47 ‘Kommunista ellenes mere´nyletek Sopron- e´s Gy´´or megye´ben’, Duna´ntu´li Szabad Ne´p, 14 Nov. 1945,
1.
48 ‘Igy e´lnek a brennbergi ba´nya´szok’, U´j Sopron, 21 Feb. 1946, 3.
49 ‘Kisnyilasokat bocsa´ttotak szabadon’, U´j Sopron, 29 Sept. 1945, 3.
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Hungary’s pre-1945 regime, but rather its re-focusing on apparent ‘reactionaries’
who staffed public administration and private business, and whom it accused the
FKgP of protecting.50
While the MKP sought to put political retribution in Hungary to work in its
attempts to mobilise its base of support and to smash the FKgP following its electoral
victory in late 1945, on the Austrian side of the border it was used to bolster the
authority of the emergent, protective state. While Hungary’s practice of anti-fascist
retribution gave licence to its police forces to attack all those they perceived to be
enemies of the ‘new’ state, and allowed open wounds from the war years to fester, the
implementation of Austria’s de-Nazification laws was not to the letter and, being more
limited, offered the potential of closure to conflict. While the 1945 De-Nazification
Law mandated the registration of all former Nazis, it extended an implicit bargain
in that it allowed them to petition for ‘clemency’ if they had never ‘misused’ their
membership of the party or one of its front organisations.51 Some of the petitions
the authorities received revealed popular understandings of this bargain – that the
state would protect from the consequences of prior political affiliations those who
professed loyalty to it. A former party member in the border town of Mo¨rbisch am
See framed his claim for clemency in 1945 on the grounds that he had been deceived
by National Socialist promises to ‘turn around the situation in agriculture’. He had
‘always regarded himself as an Austrian’ and promised that ‘in future he would act
positively towards the state’.52
Processes of separation
While the local practice of de-Nazification in Burgenland bolstered the inclusive
features of post-war Austrianness, it was deeply exclusive in other respects, as a
result of the state’s desire to define the new Austria against the Germany of which
it had been part for the seven years prior to 1945. When in 1946 officials in the
borderland were asked to document ‘National Socialist’ oppression locally, in order
to provide material for the ‘Red-White-Red’ book that was to record Austrian
‘victimhood’ at the hands of the Nazis, many returns concentrated on the dismissal
of local officials and their replacement by those brought in from Germany proper.53
The state’s definition of itself against Germany was more than simply a matter of
rhetoric. In spring 1945 the provisional government in Vienna instructed districts
to separate their residents into ‘Austrians’ and those it termed ‘Germans who came
50 ‘Mo´dot kell tala´lni az antidemokratikus ko¨zalkalmazottak elta´volı´ta´sa´ra’, Duna´ntu´li Szabad Ne´p, 4 Jan.
1946, 3.
51 Robert Knight, ‘Denazification and Integration in the Austrian Province of Carinthia’, Journal of
Modern History, 79, 3 (2007), 596.
52 BgLA, Bezirkshauptmannschaft Eisenstadt (Papers of the Eisenstadt District Governor, hereafter
BH Eisenstadt), NS-Angelegenheiten, Karton 4, H.A., Brief an die provisorische Staatsregierung,
Mo¨rbisch am See, am 20. Juli 1945.
53 Dokumentationsarchiv des O¨sterreichischen Widerstandes (Documentary Archive of the Austrian
Resistance, hereafter DO¨W), 8339.
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from the Reich’ (Reichsdeutsche), as a prelude to their removal from Austrian soil.54 In
1946 local authorities faced a steady stream of appeals from Austrian women married
to German citizens, who discovered that they were denied Austrian citizenship as a
result of their marital status, and faced deportation to Germany.55
Post-war constructions of ‘Austrianness’ did not merely seek to demarcate Austria
and Germany, but celebrated provincial identities.56 In the case of the borderland,
this meant that the reconstruction of Austrianness was tied to the rebuilding of
Burgenland identity. Burgenland had been carved out of Hungary at the end of the
First World War, as a consequence of the demands of its German minority that it be
ruled by Vienna rather than Budapest. Owing its origin in part to a political project
of ethnic Germans within the pre-war Kingdom of Hungary, dominant constructions
of its provincial identity during the inter-war years had argued for its fundamental
kinship to those western Hungarian counties populated by German speakers.57 Pan-
German nationalists dreamed of the territorial extension of the province. While the
province was divided after Austria’s incorporation into Germany between the Gaue58
of Niederdonau and Styria, Burgenland’s own Nazis had argued against Berlin that
their province should become a Gau in its own right within the expanded Reich, in
view of its distinctive ‘mission’ as a ‘borderland’ (Grenzland) that could serve as bridge
between Germany, and German speakers in Hungary.59 Berlin’s only concession to
pro-Burgenland sentiment was to establish a National Groups Office (Volkstumstelle)
in the former Burgenland capital, Eisenstadt, that supervised the region’s ethnic
minorities and maintained close contact with pro-Berlin, ethnic German activists in
the neighbouring Hungarian city of Sopron.60
These notions of Burgenland identity were revived in an unfavourable post-war
context at the precise moment that the Hungarian state engaged in its campaigns
of expulsion against the German minority. The waves of expulsion between 1945
and 1946 generally, but especially deportation in 1946, played a fundamental role
in the construction of Burgenlander and, by extension, Austrian identities in the
region and shaped perceptions of the Hungarian neighbour that strengthened the
authority and legitimacy of the Austrian state as a protector. In border villages, where
54 Niedero¨sterreichisches Landesarchiv, St. Po¨lten (Lower Austrian Provincial Archive, St. Po¨lten,
hereafter NO¨LA, St.P.), Landeshauptmannschaft Niedero¨sterreich (Lower Austrian Governor’s Office,
hereafter Ia-10)/B.nm.208/Stammzahl 29/bis ONv.74/1945, Bezirkshauptmannschaft Scheibbs.
Zl.XI-55/: Behandlung der Flu¨chtlinge und Ausla¨nder, Scheibbs, am 20.6.1945.
55 BgLA, BH Eisenstadt, II-1946, Bezirkshauptmannschaft Eisenstadt. Zl. II-86–46. Eisenstadt, den
24.1.1946.
56 Robert Kreichbaumer, ‘Einleitung’, in Robert Kreichbaumer, ed., Liebe auf den Zweiten Blick. Landes-
und O¨sterreichbewußtsein nach 1945 (Vienna, Cologne and Weimar: Bo¨hlau, 1998), 7–13.
57 Alfons Barb, ‘Der Burgenla¨nder’, repr. in Elisabeth Bockhorn, Olaf Bockhorn and Veronika
Plo¨ckinger, eds., ‘Die Geburt des Burgenla¨nders’. Ein Lesebuch zur Historischen Volkskultur im Burgenland
(Eisenstadt: Wissenschaftliche Arbeiten aus dem Burgenland, 2004), 83–9.
58 Sub-national administrative units in Nazi Germany.
59 DO¨W, 11498.
60 O¨sterreichisches Staatsarchiv, Archiv der Republik (hereafter O¨StA/AdR), Reichkommisar fu¨r die
Wiedervereinigung O¨sterreichs mit dem Deutschen Reich (hereafter ‘Bu¨rckel’/Materie), Zl.2770,
Kt.83, 37.
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ties of kin often spread into villages on the Hungarian side, expulsion provoked
particular outrage. When ethnic Germans returned home in late 1945 to north-
western Hungarian villages such as Magyarkimle to find that their homes and land
had been redistributed to settlers, they launched an armed uprising with the goal
of reclaiming their property, using flight over the border and networks of solidarity
with kin on the Austrian side to sustain their fight. While they were beaten back as
the Hungarian state flooded the border region with armed police, both the central
government and its local representatives remained worried at their lack of control
over the border.61
Public opinion, the political parties, opinion formers and even officials in
the Burgenland government responded to Hungarian violence against borderland
Germans by claiming them as ‘Austrians’, and arguing – in an adaptation of pan-
German arguments from the inter-war years to post-war circumstances – that the
lands they inhabited were, in fact, eastern Burgenland. These arguments sought to
differentiate Hungary’s German-speakers from Germans proper, and underline their
kinship to ‘Austrians’ living on the Burgenland side of the border. ‘Hungary’s German
speakers refer to themselves as Donauschwaben and Heidebauern, and are so known by
the Hungarians; they know nothing of Germany’, according to one opponent of
expulsion used by officials in the Burgenland government to make their case against
Hungary. These officials in the Burgenland government lobbied Vienna to intervene
with the occupying powers, especially the Soviet Army, against expulsion, on the
grounds that ethnic Germans ‘settled right on the border, can be seen as good
Austrians’.62 Others argued for a solution that allowed for the Moson and Sopron
districts closest to the border to be removed from Hungary and incorporated into
Burgenland.63
When the Hungarian government drew up regulations to intern German citizens
on its territory in spring 1945 it had been aware that some would claim exemption
on the grounds of their ‘Austrianness’. While it argued that Austrian citizens could
not be regarded automatically as ‘German citizens’, the authorities had to ‘pay
attention to’ Austria’s ‘true relationship to the German Reich, which had existed
over several years’.64 Neither the Hungarian state, nor the left-wing parties who
most enthusiastically supported expulsion were prepared to make any concession to
claims that borderland German speakers should be exempted on grounds of their
‘Austrianness’. Aware of calls in the Burgenland press for a redrawing of the border,
the Hungarian police rounded up five ethnic Germans for spreading pro-Austrian
propaganda in Sopron during early 1946. Prosecutors accused them, in a political
trial designed to serve as a warning to authorities across the border, of conspiring
with leading Burgenland politicians to launch an armed uprising in Hungary to
61 GyMSM.Gy.L., XXIf.1b.5d., Kedves Medei ke´pvisel´´o elvta´rs!
62 O¨StA/AdR, Bundesministerium fu¨r auswa¨rtige Angelegenheiten 2. Republik (hereafter BMfAA),
II-Pol, Ungarn 9, Gz.110.054-pol/46, Z.110.394-pol/46.
63 O¨StA/AdR, BMfAA, II-Pol, Gz.110.054-pol./46, Z.42.072-pol./46.
64 GyMSM.SL., XXI/21/b, 4d., 1066/1945, KEOKH. Sza´m: 25/162.VII.e.1945.eln., Ma´solat.
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secure territorial changes.65 Vienna, mindful of the likely Soviet reaction, were it to
show any willingness to lobby openly for territorial change or a halt to deportation,
remained silent, and urged restraint on Burgenland’s government.66 By early 1946 the
Hungarian state prepared for the organised deportation of most of those it identified
as Hungary’s ethnic Germans to Germany. The MKP press in western Hungary
celebrated what it believed would bring to an end tension generated by the more
generalised expulsion efforts it had organised from spring 1945: ‘The time is coming
fast, when we will be able to start deporting the Hungarian Swabians.’67
The expulsion drives, which culminated in the deportations during spring 1946,
confronted several problems. The first was the fluid and problematic nature of ethnic
identities in the borderlands. The published results of the 1941 census recorded
719,762 people, or 4.9 per cent of Hungary’s population, identifying themselves
as German-speakers, although it bears mention that these figures were themselves
contested strongly by political representatives of the German minority itself.68 In
many western border districts the proportions were higher. In the Mosonmagyaro´va´r
district, 37.2 per cent of the population declared themselves German-speakers and in
the Sopron district 39.3 per cent, while 12.7 and 29.9 per cent respectively identified
themselves as such in the cities of Mosonmagyaro´va´r and Sopron.69 Many ethnic
Germans had a ‘dual identity’ that was both Magyar and German, for German often
functioned as a local language rarely used beyond the boundaries of home villages,
while ties of kin and friendship often transcended the ambiguous ethnic divide.70
Furthermore, ethnic German identity did not imply political sympathy for Germany’s
political goals during the war; Volksbund organisations only ever operated in twenty-
five villages in Gy´´or-Moson and Sopron counties, and never mobilised anything like
all ethnic German residents in these villages.71
This contributed to bureaucratic confusion and arbitrariness as to who was to
be marked out for either expulsion or, later, deportation. The process of selection
was mired in confusion over goals, for the Hungarian state was never consistent in
applying the principle of collective guilt to all ethnic Germans, and argued that those
who could demonstrate ‘loyalty’ to Hungary should be exempt.72 When asked to draw
up lists for eventual expulsion in 1945 they faced an absolute lack of documentary
evidence; in A´gfalva the notary commented that his list rested on no independent
65 DO¨W, 20000/j5, Vom Volksgericht in Gy´´or. Zahl:Nb.859/1946/13; O¨StA/AdR, BMfAA, II-
Pol/Ungarn 9, Gz.105.319-pol/47, Z.108.721-pol./1947.
66 O¨StA/AdR, BMfAA, II-Pol, Ungarn 9, Gz.110.353-Pol/46, Z. 110.353-Pol/46, 247-Pr/46.
67 ‘A mosoni sva´bok millio´s e´rte´keket lopnak ki a hata´ron tu´lra’, Duna´ntu´li Szabad Ne´p, 11 Jan. 1946), 3.
68 Gu¨nter Scho¨dl, ‘Lange Abschiede: Die Su¨dostdeutschen und ihre Vaterla¨nder (1918–1945)’, in Gu¨nter
Scho¨dl, ed., Deutsche Geschichte im Osten Europas. Land an der Donau (Berlin: Siedler Verlag, 1995),
520.
69 Az 1941 E´vi Ne´psza´mlala´s Ko¨zse´gek Szerint (Budapest: Stephaneum Nyomda, 1947), 536–8, 602–3.
70 This point is made for another part of Hungary by the ethnographer Gyo¨rgyi Bindorffer in her Kett´´os
Identita´s: Etnikai e´s nemzeti azonossa´gtudat Dunabogda´nyban (Budapest: U´j Manda´tum Ko¨nyvkiado´ –
MTA Kisebbse´gkutato´ Inte´zet, 2001).
71 Gyo¨rgy Zielbauer, Adatok e´s Te´nyek a Magyarorsza´gi Ne´metse´g To¨rte´neteb´´ol (1945–1949) (Budapest:
Akade´miai Kiado´, 1989), 16.
72 To´th, Migrationen in Ungarn, 35–70.
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evidence and contained the names of some he believed to be patriotic Hungarians.73
These local lists were scrapped when organised deportation began in spring 1946, as
the compilation of deportation lists was placed in the hands of national civil servants
and the authorities went to considerable lengths to exclude local actors from the
process. This was combined with heavy-handed implementation. Three hundred
policemen were imported into Sopron from outside the region in order to ensure
that order was kept during the process.74 As the lists were prepared over the Easter
weekend the city was sealed from the outside world, the serving of alcohol was
banned in local restaurants, and a night-time curfew enforced.75 The police hunted
down those on the list who hid; during one night-time raid in early May 1946 almost
80 eighty per cent of the city’s houses were searched.76
The 1946 deportations allowed the impression of a despotic state to crystallise in
western Hungarian communities, as the demonstration of arbitrary state power against
a group that it argued was its enemy created real fear that transcended the ethnic
divide. The sight of deportees being rounded up and placed on cattle trucks awakened
fears that reached back to popular memories of the deportation of local Jews in 1944.
In Mosonmagyaro´va´r, the local organ of the left-wing Social Democratic Party,
normally supportive of the MKP, reflected commonly held opinion when it equated
the removal of Germans with the events of two years earlier: ‘Expulsion77 . . . two years
ago it was called deportation.’78 Reactions to deportation were therefore a product
of the way in which it demonstrated the power and will of the state to act against the
civilian population. This apparent despotism weakened the state’s legitimacy, and its
institutions found that the willingness of the population to co-operate with them was
weakened as a consequence. The MKP mayor of Mosonmagyaro´va´r complained in
April 1946 of the deportations’ corrosive effect in his city on the political authority
of the organs of the new state.79
Faced with the threat of removal through deportation from Moson or Sopron to
Freilassing in southern Bavaria in 1946, many fled over the border, with the intention
of returning at a later date.80 Some took their property with them to prevent its
confiscation.81 Ethnic German refugees from Hungary met with sympathy from the
73 GyMSM.SL., XXI/21/a, 1d., A´gfalvai jegyz´´ot´´ol. Hiv.sza´m 2/1945.Eln., A´gfalva, 1945. ma´jus 28.-e´n.
74 ‘A he´t ve´ge´ig 420 kitelepite´si tisztvisel´´o e´s alkalmazott sza´ma´ra kell helyet biztositani maga´nlaka´sokban’,
Soproni U´jsa´g, 12 April 1946, 3.
75 ‘A polga´rmesterhelyettes nyilatkozata a kitelepite´sre keru¨l´´ok ne´vsora´ro´l’, Soproni U´jsa´g, 25 April 1946,
3.
76 ‘Razzia´n a “mozga´si korla´toza´s” ideje alatt’, Soproni U´jsa´g, 5 May 1946, 3.
77 It bears mention that the Hungarian state referred even to formal deportation using the more
neutral term ‘expulsion’ (kitelepı´te´s). This was precisely because the term ‘deportation’ evoked directly
comparison with the deportation of Hungary’s Jews in 1944.
78 ‘Akiket elvittek, e´s akik itt maradtak’, Mosonmagyaro´va´ri Bara´tsa´g, 2 June 1946, 2.
79 GyMSM.Gy.L., XXIf.1b.5.d, Mosonmagyaro´va´r megyei va´ros polga´rmestere´t´´ol. Jelente´s, 1946 a´prilis
ho´ro´l.
80 GyMSM.Gy.L., XXIf.1b.5d.; Mosonmagyaro´va´r megyei va´ros polga´rmestere´t´´ol. Jelente´s, 1946 ma´jus
ho´ro´l.
81 BgLA BH Mattersburg, XI-Situationsberichte, Grenzgendarmeriekommandos Schattendorf, April
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population on the Austrian side of the border. Furthermore, the ‘settlers’ who had
taken their homes and property were unpopular, and were blamed for cross-border
crime in border villages such as Nickelsdorf and Zurndorf.82 Minor officials showed
similar sympathy for the plight of refugees, granting border passes, in contravention of
the regulations, so that they could return to Hungary to visit relatives, to explosions
of fury from the Hungarian authorities.83 This sympathy and the belief that expelled
populations from the western border regions were of ‘Austrian character’ provoked
a loosening of both work permit and citizenship regulations that made it easier for
them to claim Austrian citizenship.84
The 1946 deportations created a dynamic of mutual suspicion on both sides of
the border which drove a process of separation. While they led many in Austria
to see the state over the border as threatening, and generated considerable local
sympathy for Hungarian refugees, in Hungary these reactions helped drive a climate
of suspicion. Both the local and national state saw the relatively open border as an
active threat to the country’s security. This was reinforced by apparent attempts by
deportees to return home. In Fert´´ora´kos, in one of several such incidents along the
border, police were called in March 1947 after five former residents returned from
Austria in order to resettle and take back the property that had been confiscated
from them and redistributed to new settlers.85 The border played a central role in the
Hungarian left’s politics of economic security. During 1947 the MKP smashed the
FKgP through the use of the police in order to cement its control over the popular
front coalition and prepare the ground for the construction of dictatorship. A vital
accompaniment of this campaign was the mobilisation of industrial workers and the
poor, by blaming their poor material situation, persistent high prices and the food
shortages on ‘speculators’ and the ‘reaction’.86 Ethnic Germans who had escaped
deportation were often blamed for ‘smuggling’ and ‘speculation’, accusations that
were used to justify the further confiscation of property and expulsion in 1948.87
The deterioration of cross-border relations and the politicisation of smuggling
continued with the construction of overt dictatorship in Hungary during 1948 and
1949. With opponents of the emergent dictatorship fleeing in large numbers and
Hungary gripped by cold war paranoia, ethnic Germans returning to Hungary and
Austrian smugglers were labelled as ‘spies’ and ‘enemies’ against which Hungary’s
western border needed to be secured. According to one piece of propaganda in
March 1949, ‘the cells in the Mosonmagyaro´va´r police station were full yesterday of
illegal border crossers. Horse and livestock traders, ethnic Germans [sva´bok] seeking
to return, German and Austrian citizens after food, and escaping fascists waited out
82 BgLA, A/VII-II/II-1, Zahl:Pra¨s.2/27–1947. Neusiedl am See, am 30.3.1947. Situationsbericht fu¨r
Ma¨rz 1947.
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84 BgLA BH Mattersburg, XI-Polizei, Arbeitsamt Burgenland. Eisenstadt, den 15.6.1948.
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the afternoon.’88 Budapest implemented a scheme that involved the physical closure
of the border, the creation of barbed-wire fences separating the two countries, the
construction of a network of watchtowers and the clearing of all land of vegetation
within 500 metres of the border.89 When it demanded that Austria create a similar
zone on its side of the border and Vienna refused, Hungary retaliated by closing the
border to all Austrian farmers with properties on their side, to fury in Burgenland
border villages.90
Two states in a divided borderland
On the morning of 9 April 1950 in Schattendorf twelve residents left Sunday mass and
walked through the cemetery that lay adjacent to the barbed-wire fence that marked
the border with Hungary. As they did so they were fired on by the Hungarian border
guard. One shot went right over their heads, hitting a bush that lay just behind them.
Panic ensued as the men left the cemetery as quickly as they could, as more shots
were fired by the Hungarians.91 Between the closure of the border in 1949 and the
temporary thaw along it in summer 1956, the Austrian authorities recorded a string of
incidents, which included attempts by Hungarian border guards to kidnap Austrian
citizens, one shooting of an Austrian gendarme, and numerous instances of people
being fired on; a string of injuries due to the accidental explosion of mines by people
walking close to the border, fires, and even an instance of Hungarian border guards
protecting agricultural workers trespassing on Austrian territory to steal the crops of
local farmers.92 The Austrian authorities lodged diplomatic protests when confronted
with each incident; the Hungarians rejected their protests, arguing that the fault lay
with the Austrian side, and that they had a duty to defend their borders.93
Despite the unpleasant and abnormal everyday reality of living next to a contested
border, it provided one aspect of the background that enabled the emergent Austrian
state to construct its legitimate authority as a protector of local residents. This had
begun in 1945, when it protected borderland residents from disorder generated by the
Soviet occupation authorities. In 1950, although the end of the occupation lay five
years in the future, the state had restored law and order, while the Red Army, although
still present, was by no means as oppressive a presence as it had been during the late
1940s.94 With the expulsion of ethnic Germans from Hungary and the subsequent
rise in tension along the border, an anti-communist consensus, shaped by events
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in Hungary, bolstered the legitimacy of the Austrian state in northern Burgenland.
Fraudulent elections and the repression directed against the Catholic Church in
Hungary offended public opinion,95 as did the material hardship inflicted on Austrian
property owners by their inability to cross the border to work their land after 1949.96
The way in which this consensus strengthened the state was demonstrated during a
crisis in the wake of the Fourth Wage and Price Agreement during September and
October 1950, the latest of a round of agreements that cemented Austria’s post-war
‘social partnership’ between capital and labour, through which the national trade
union leadership had agreed to a process of managed real-wage reductions as part
of a generalised economic stabilisation package. The resulting rebellion in factories
was backed by the KPO¨, enabling the federal government, union establishment
and the SPO¨ to break the strike movement by denouncing it as a Communist plot.97
Despite the unpopularity of government economic policies caused by the real material
hardship for those living on fixed incomes in Burgenland as a consequence of almost
constant pressure on real wages, the anti-communist consensus ensured that there
was little industrial protest, even in many industrial communities in the region.98
On the other side of the border, despite its deployment of considerable violence
the Hungarian state was weakened by its failure to generate real legitimacy for itself.
While it used repression to secure its rule against the majority of the population that
opposed it, which included religious believers and much of the rural population –
which it attempted to force into agricultural co-operatives – it had built some
conditional legitimacy through mobilising the industrial working class and rural poor
by promising material improvement. By 1950, as forced industrialisation, the regime’s
attempts to feed the urban centres and collectivisation led to severe cuts in living
standards, even this conditional legitimacy was gone.99 In the western borderlands its
position was far weaker. When it nationalised church schools in 1948, one of the few
places in the country where it provoked open protest was in Sopron, where local
priests, teachers and pupils marched against the measure. To assert its authority the
local regime was forced to bus in 15,000 activists from the rest of the country to
stage a counter-protest against the machinations of the ‘clerical reaction’.100 The fury
generated in villages by collectivisation, high taxation and the government’s attacks
on organised religion meant that in many borderland villages, while a semblance
of order was maintained through a heavy police presence, the local regime lacked
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any positive authority at all.101 Even in Sopron’s factories local party activists were
forced to concede that the regime had no real support among the working class, for
even most of the Stakhanovites – its exceptional workers – were ethnic Germans,
alienated from the regime by its policies of ethnic exclusion during the period of its
construction.102
Nationally the Hungarian state compensated for its lack of legitimacy by a reliance
on repression, which made the regime dangerously unstable and prepared the ground
for its rapid collapse during the 1956 Revolution.103 It discriminated against the
borderlands, whose urban centres, especially Sopron, were starved of new investment
and lost industrial establishments and cultural institutions. It also restricted the
freedom of border region residents severely, creating a border zone in order to
cut residents off from the rest of the country, and deported those it regarded as ‘class
enemies’ to other parts of Hungary.104 This combination of retribution and control
did not strengthen the regime, but generated complaints. When the regime crumbled
during 1956 as a result of splits within the party and chronic lack of legitimacy and
support among the population, these complaints shaped local political demands. In
summer 1956 residents demanded the lifting of restrictions of travel between the
border zone and the rest of Hungary and the legalisation of small-scale cross-border
traffic with Austria.105 While such hopes were dashed after the suppression of the
1956 Revolution, border region residents accommodated themselves reluctantly to
the regime under which they were forced to live. With the post-1956 regime more
aware that its survival depended on tacit compromise with those it ruled than its
immediate predecessor had been, the authorities in the border region constantly
pressured Budapest to make the lives of its residents more tolerable.106
The terms of the peace established after 1945 in the borderlands were unequal, in
that those who lived in Austria found the peace they were offered easier to accept
than those on the Hungarian side of the border. The state established in Hungary
was weaker, even though, seemingly paradoxically, it was more repressive. This was
because of its relative failure in establishing legitimate state authority, which rendered
the regime in Budapest vulnerable to outright collapse in 1956, and left its leaders
profoundly insecure between 1957 and 1989.
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If the events of the mid-1950s in Hungary confirmed that for as long as the post-
war settlement held its socialist regime could not be replaced, they also underlined
the fragility of that regime. In Austria the mid-1950s underlined the strength of
legitimate authority possessed by the state that had been built since 1945. A year
before the outbreak of the 1956 Revolution, Austria’s leaders had signed a State
Treaty with the allies that restored their sovereignty on condition of neutrality. The
treaty allowed for the withdrawal of the Red Army from Burgenland. During the
Hungarian Revolution and its suppression neutrality was tested as a consequence
of the upheaval on its eastern border and the temporary housing in the country of
tens of thousands of refugees.107 The way in which this revealed the strength of the
formula of the protective state, through which the new Austrian state constructed its
legitimacy after 1945, was indicated by the changing attitude to the army, established
by the State Treaty a year previously. At the time of its establishment many had argued
against its creation, on the grounds that in the war years ‘enough fathers and sons of
this land died for nothing’,108 and that money to be spent on the new military ‘should
be better put to more productive uses’.109 By early 1957 the army could make its
case credibly to the Burgenland population by arguing that ‘the events in Hungary
threatened military action on our eastern border. Does anyone now doubt that we
need an army to defend our homeland?’110
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